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Introduction 
As part of the Strengthening Forest Monitoring and 
Wildlife Law Enforcement projects led by the Centre 
for International Development and Training (CIDT) and 
Conservation Justice in the Congo Basin, focused on 
sustaining and institutionalising the role of civil society 
in countering forest and wildlife crime, CIDT is leading 
research on various issues relevant to this topic. 
This paper provides an overview of literature on illegal 
wildlife trade (IWT) and particularly on the responses and 
tools implemented to curb and combat this issue and 
related crimes. It explores approaches adopted at site 
level against poaching but also initiatives undertaken 
by different stakeholder groups to fight trafficking and 
prosecution of offenders. With the failure of traditional 
regulatory and law enforcement options, complementary 
solutions which focus on alternative livelihoods, working 
with communities and civil society organisations 
on wildlife monitoring, investigations, prosecution 
and collaborative law enforcement with government 
agencies need strengthening. Fighting corruption and 
strengthening law enforcement capabilities remain 
critical. Multi-stakeholder collaborative research and 
evidence is critical in informing policy decision making 
but also providing the ammunition required by civil 
society for research informed advocacy campaigns. 
Improving transparency in the sector through community 
monitoring, investigations, media coverage and use of 
modern technologies provide opportunities for naming 
and shaming and exposing the modus operandi of 
criminal networks operating in the area. Linking national 
advocacy efforts to global governance frameworks such 
as CITES provide additional frameworks for addressing 
the underlying drivers of this trade.
The Problem and drivers
Illegal wildlife trade (IWT) involves the illegal capture, 
collection, hunting, poaching, trade and smuggling of 
endangered, protected wildlife, derivatives and or its 
products (Maher and Sollund, 2016). In addition to 
small scale hunting by relatively local people mainly 
for subsistence1 and large scale illegal hunting by 
armed non state and state actors (Ondouaet al., 2017), 
IWT involves complex transnational crime networks 
which strive from direct engagement or sponsorship of 
these activities(Wittig, 2016). IWT is at the heart of the 
relationship between the conservation of biodiversity, 
health and sustainable development. It has major 
implications on “Global Health” which depends on human 
health, animal health and environment health. The trade 
in illegally harvested wildlife , products and derivatives is 
a big business, estimated to be worth billions of dollars 
annually and involves a large network of actors (hunters/
collectors- buyers- middlemen- sellers, transporters- 
consumers…) (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
2020). IWT is growing fast suggesting that current tools 
and responses have been inadequate (Maher and Sollund, 
2016). This information note reviews some of these 
responses, their strengths and weaknesses and reflects 
on some ways forward.
It is widely accepted the impacts of IWT go beyond the 
loss of biodiversity and livelihoods for those who depend 
on them, but also extend to other socio economic and 
security threats to nation states and internationally(Kassa 
et al., 2019).It is estimated that about 75% of newly 
emerging infectious diseases are zoonoses derived 
partly from illegally harvested and traded species. A wide 
range of traditional Chinese medicines are made from 
wildlife products, such as pangolin scales, snake bile, 
and bat faeces which increases the risk of transmission 
of diseases (Wang et al., 2020).The 2002-2003, severe 
acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS emerged from wet 
wildlife markets in China and subsequently spread to over 
26 countries worldwide caused by a zoonotic coronavirus 
(Wittemyer, 2020). The Ebola epidemic in West Africa 
(Gebreyes et al., 2014) and the global COVID 19 pandemic 
are stack reminders of the global catastrophic impacts of 
trade in wildlife species (Anderson et al., 2020).
IWT unfortunately also traps states in a vicious circle 
where, as they lose massive income due to illegality, 
they become even less capable to properly govern their 
natural resources (Nelleman et al., 2016). The London 
Conference on Illegal Wildlife Trade in October 2018 
admitted that in addition to corruption and associated 
illicit financial flows, the illegal wildlife trade was taking 
resources away from government revenues. In that 
context, participating governments agreed to work 
together, considering IWT as a serious and organized 
crime. The conference also stressed on the need to work 
in partnerships to address local livelihoods, capacity 
building for wildlife management departments, and 
engagement with local communities, the private sector, 
NGOs and academia in these fields (Government of 
United Kingdom, 2019).
Increasingly, IWT fuels the development and expansion 
of organized crime including terrorist and militia groups 
(Ondoua et al., 2017). A recent Interpol report suggested 
that environmental crime has become the largest driver 
of conflict in the world (Nelleman et al., 2016). This 
category of crime which includes logging, poaching and 
trafficking of a wide range of animals, illegal fisheries, 
illegal mining and dumping of toxic waste, is now worth 
$110-281 billion annually. Wildlife trafficking alone is 
the fifth most profitable criminal activity globally (Kassa 
et al., 2019). In the east of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo alone, environmental crime was approximately 
$770 million in 2018, about 20% more than the country’s 
budget the same year2. According to Lawson and Vines 
(2014), terrorist groups and armed militias are heavily 
involved in illegal poaching of elephants for ivory trade 
and hunting of other rare and endangered animals. 
They have developed a large transnational illicit network 
for the trade of such products: such as the Janjaweed 
militia in Chad, the Somali warlords who have developed 
connexions with poachers in Kenya. Lawson and Vines 
(2014) showed that elephant poachers in DRC were 
connected to other militia groups such as the Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Mai 
Mai rebel groups. 
1. Not the focus of this information note
2. See: https://www.reuters.com/article/congo-budget/congo-cabinet-says-adopts-2018-budget-of-65-bln-idUSL8N1NK8ZV
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State failure and weak law 
enforcement
In addition to the demand side issues raised earlier, one 
of the other main drivers of global trade in illegal wildlife 
species has been the failure of national governments 
and multilateral agencies to monitor and enforce wildlife 
legislation. The failure of national governments to address 
these challenges have led to calls for multi-stakeholder 
governance processes beyond government (Cashore 
and Stone, 2012). Since 2012, according to Biggs et 
al. (2017), efforts to address the problem of wildlife 
crime have attracted more than 350 million US dollars in 
funding from governments and other donors including the 
implementation of several high-level intergovernmental 
policy initiatives at national, regional and international 
levels. 
These include amongst others, initiatives summarized in the 
following table: 
Table 1: Regional and international initiatives against IWT
Initiative Date 
The London Conference on Wildlife 2014 and 2018
UN General Assembly Resolution 2015
The Brazzaville - African Union 
International Conference on Illegal 
Exploitation and Illicit Trade in Wild 
Flora and Fauna in Africa
2015




CITES Conference of parties (CoP) Takes place every 3 
years (the last three 
CoPs took place in 
2013, 2016 and 2019)
Source: compiled by authors
There is recognition that tackling this challenge requires 
a coordinated, multifaceted/multi-stakeholder approach, 
including a wide range of actors and actions on the ground 
beyond governments, international wildlife protection 
NGOs, international donors and regulatory bodies, local 
communities, national and transnational civil society, as 
well even those involved in the illicit trade (Lawson and 
Vines, 2014).
However, there continues to be limited understanding of 
what mix of tools is required to attain human security 
and development objectives while protecting the natural 
biodiversity. Sunderlin (2005) had already called for 
increased research on these issues arguing that policy 
makers often lacked understanding of the diverse links 
between forests, livelihoods and conservation objectives. 
This information note seeks to continue this discussion 
through a review of ongoing responses to the problem of 
IWT in its broad sense including anti-poaching3 and anti-
trafficking, particularly in developing country contexts. 
Current responses and 
tools
Responses to the IWT problem can be classified broadly 
into two main categories: regulatory and non- regulatory 
responses. Regulatory responses focus on institutional/rule 
setting and law enforcement often taking a conservationist 
“hard perspective”; while non regulatory approaches take a 
“soft perspective” and stress the role of local communities, 
local knowledge and livelihoods in addressing IWT 
challenges (Biggs et al., 2017). The following sections 
review existing responses and tools identified in the 
literature, to highlight that various mixtures of regulatory 
and non-regulatory approaches are used, according to the 
local context and in response to different aspects of this 
complex phenomenon.
Regulatory policy responses
Historically, most of the policy responses adopted by 
governments to the problem of IWT, especially in African 
countries, have been regulatory in nature, characterised 
by top down, centrally planned approaches, and in 
many cases driven by external pressure from foreign 
governments, donors and international development/
conservation agencies. Examples included the creation 
of socially exclusive national parks and protected areas 
(PAs), the introduction of new or more rigid legislations, 
the establishment of more trade controls, and engagement 
with international treaties, such as the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES). In the following paragraphs, we aim to 
briefly present some of these options. 
Legislations and international regulations
Most countries in the world have some form of legislation 
around the harvest and trade in wildlife and wildlife 
products. These laws and regulations are designed in 
most cases to promote sustainable management of these 
resources. While some of the legislation is proactively 
designed to address current and future challenges, a lot 
tends to happen reactively in response to unforeseen 
governance failings. Under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, 
India passed the Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972 to create 
new protected areas, banned export of tigers and leopard 
skins, and secured international funding for conservation 
efforts (Johnson et al., 2018). In Cameroon, the main law 
regulating forests, fauna and fishing is law number 94/01, 
issued in 1994, in addition to a number of relevant decrees 
and executive orders (Djeukam et al., 2012); while in Gabon, 
the main law dealing with wildlife, law number 16/2001, 
was promulgated later in time, in December 2001 (Christy, 
2012). Following the outbreak of the Coronavirus in China, 
the country’s top legislature comprehensively prohibited 
the consumption of terrestrial wildlife to protect public 
health (Wang et al., 2020). Neighbouring countries such as 
Vietnam have also initiated new legislative processes to 
stop illegal trading and consumption of wildlife over fears 
3. Poaching is the illegal killing, trapping or capture of any animal for the express purpose of either personal need or financial gain (Ondoua et 
al., 2017). Ondoua and colleagues identify three levels including small legal hunting by local communities for subsistence/bushmeat, small 
illegal hunting by communities and large scale illegal hunting by armed state and non state actors.
it spreads disease (Humphrey, 2020). While these latest 
legislative efforts have widely received global acclaim 
(Wittemyer, 2020), many observers argue that where 
legislation exist, often it is poorly designed, providing many 
loopholes which not only limit their enforcement but also 
exclude other stakeholders with the ability to monitor and 
enforce it such as communities and civil society (Mbzibain 
and Ongolo, 2019).
In most of Central Africa, most countries have inherited 
their legal systems from their former European colonizers, 
with centralized land rights and ownership of wildlife 
and land mainly in the hands of the State. Throughout 
Central Africa, wildlife hunting is officially banned and 
only permitted through special licences yet, bush meat 
is readily accessible in the region (Roe and Jack, 2011). 
In Cameroon for example, the law No. 94/01 of January 
1994, is the main legislative text dealing with Forestry, 
Wildlife and Fisheries, along with its subsequent orders 
and decrees. This law only recognizes the right of the 
Cameroonian state agencies, especially the officials of 
forestry, wildlife, fishery and merchant shipping services 
(serving as judicial police officers) to identify and report 
law violations concerning protected species. They are the 
only ones with the legal ability to bring cases to the state 
prosecutor (Djeukam et al., 2012). This limits community 
engagement and accountability amongst forestry and 
wildlife officials. Recent efforts by local and international 
NGOs4 to forge collaborative efforts with traditional law 
enforcement agencies such as the police and the judiciary 
highlight opportunities for improving law enforcement 
through stronger citizen engagement (Mbzibain and 
Nkuintchua, upcoming). International cooperation also has 
a role to play in law enforcement.
The primary international framework for prevention of loss 
of endangered species due to international wildlife trade 
is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). This treaty, which 
has been ratified by 183 countries in 1973, has entered 
into force in 1975, in order to coordinate and regulate 
international trade in wildlife products. The strongest tool 
the CITES has for protection is to include a specific specie 
to its list in Appendix I, which restricts international trade 
in the specified species to “exceptional circumstances 
only”. In other words, an international trade ban is placed 
on all specimens included in this list, or their body parts, 
for commercial purposes at national or international 
levels. CITES has another list of species in its Appendix 
II, which requires monitoring in trade in those species. In 
other words, trade in the species mentioned in Appendix II 
requires an export permit, which can only be issued after 
the determination of the level of trade allowed based on 
their survival rate and that all specimens are obtained 
according to the national laws. All parties of the CITES 
meet regularly (every 3 years) at a Conference of Parties 
(CoP), where they vote on listing decisions of different 
species in Appendix I or II, while the Appendix III contains 
species that are protected in at least one country, which 
has asked other CITES Parties for assistance in controlling 
4. https://www.eagle-enforcement.org/
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the trade. Changes to Appendix III follow a distinct 
procedure from changes to Appendices I and II, as each 
Party’s is entitled to make unilateral amendments to it5.
The main reference for including wild fauna in its 
appendices is the Red List of the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN). The Red List represents 
an authoritative body of scientific knowledge on different 
species and the risks they face in terms of extinction. 
While CITES largely depends on the IUCN Red List for 
the identification of the species in need of protection, 
research highlights that there is a significant delay in 
the application of the scientific knowledge of the IUCN 
to the policy formulation at the CITES level. First, it 
takes CITES a minimum of three years to respond to 
IUCN’s assessments. Second, analysts like Frank and 
Wilcove found out that there is still a significant gap in 
the protection of endangered species from international 
trade, as almost 28% of the species in the IUCN Red List 
were not included in any of the CITES appendixes (Frank 
and Wilcove, 2019). 
Law enforcement
A key recommendation from the global IWT conference 
hosted by the UK government in 2014 was the need 
to strengthen wildlife law enforcement at both site 
and national levels (Henson et al., 2016). Henson 
et al. propose three main strategies for effective 
law enforcement including; (a) strengthening law 
enforcement patrols at site level to fight poaching; (b) 
building law enforcement management capacities in 
leadership, planning and resources mobilisation and 
(c) mobilising intelligence and investigations for law 
enforcement operations, arrests and prosecution of 
wildlife crime perpetrators.
The use of rangers and patrols as an anti-poaching 
strategy is widely documented including its strengths and 
weaknesses (Ondoua et al., 2016; Moreto et al., 2016). 
The primary responsibility of wildlife rangers in protected 
areas is to ensure the territorial integrity and safety 
for an area of responsibility. Unfortunately, because of 
increased militarisation and heavy arms/rangers being 
shot at (Jooste and Ferreira, 2018; Bouche et al., 2012); 
more and more rangers and patrols are being asked to 
play a stronger law enforcement role. In some cases, this 
actually entails applying military principles in wildlife law 
enforcement. 
This legitimised use of violence by the governments 
is usually justified by discourses around how certain 
endangered species, such as elephants or tigers, 
represent a part of their national heritage and that they 
are on the brink of extinction (Sherstha and Lapeyere, 
2018).The creation of military buffer zones has been 
reported to reduce poaching around protected areas 
where government presence is weak or absent. Military 
tactics and technology are used in the “modernization” 
of conservation efforts but also to demonstrate focus of 
the state’s strategic security interests. More researchers 
are now referring to this increased use of military and 
paramilitary technology, practices and personnel as 
“green militarization” (Lunstrum, 2014). This approach 
has proven to be, to say the least, controversial. This “war 
on poaching” had, for example, severe consequences 
in Tanzania. Since the Tanzanian president Jakaya 
Kikwete ordered a military approach to enforce the 
ban on elephant and rhino poaching in October 2013, 
it was proven by a parliamentary enquiry that security 
forces have in fact been responsible for the rape, torture 
and murder of locals. The investigation proved that 
13 people were murdered and thousands of livestock 
–on which many local livelihoods depend- were killed 
or maimed (Roe et al., 2014). In reality, this so- called 
“war on poaching” can prove to be dangerous to local 
civilian populations, like any other war. According to 
Moreto et al (2016) this may also create conflicts and 
negative attitudes towards rangers and hence constrain 
collaboration for improved law enforcement. 
As highlighted by Henson et al (2016), a key law 
enforcement strategy involves strengthening the 
capabilities of management to respond to emerging 
threats. This includes improvement planning and 
response as well as capacitation in terms of modern 
equipment and technologies. The use of new 
technologies to support government efforts in the fight 
against IWT is on the rise globally. These include the 
use of camera traps, collaring devices lined to satellite-
tracking technology, conservation drones amongst 
others. The use of these technologies increases 
efficiency and effectiveness in the monitoring of 
endangered wildlife species and enhances the capability 
to act quickly in response to alerts from the technologies. 
The costs of acquisition and maintenance of these 
technologies are the key challenges. Additionally, there 
remains a digital divide regarding access and use of 
these technologies with potential for increasing fear and 
tensions with forest dependent communities (Sherstha 
and Lapeyere, 2018).
The ability to gather intelligence, carry out operations, 
investigations and prosecutions is a key law enforcement 
component (van Uhm and Moreto, 2017). These actions 
target site level infringements such as poaching but also 
anti-trafficking activities of criminal networks. According 
to Salum et al (2018), effective wildlife law enforcement 
requires well-functioning and efficient prosecution 
outcomes to punish offenders but unfortunately 
authorities and courts function poorly and prosecution of 
wildlife is not prioritised. According to Bamwine (2019) 
successful prosecution of wildlife crimes requires high 
quality crime scene evidence and intelligence as well as 
strong awareness and mastery of the wildlife regulations 
to be able to sanction cases accordingly. This also 
requires coordination between magistrates, conservation 
agencies, traditional law enforcement agencies such 
as the police and other stakeholders involved in law 
enforcement such as local and international NGOs (Salum 
et al, 2018). Evidence from Conservation Justice (2020) 
through its ALFF/ALEFI project as well as the EAGLE 
network6 demonstrate best practices in collaborative law 
enforcement efforts where NGOs work hand in hand with 
law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to punish 
offenders.
5. CITES official website: https://cites.org/eng/disc/how.php
6. https://www.eagle-enforcement.org/
In addition to inadequate sanctions, prioritisation of 
wildlife law enforcement within the judiciary, corruption 
is a key underlying challenge for law enforcement. 
According to Bamwine (2019) and the European 
Union (2005), corruption within enforcement agencies 
disrupts efforts to address wildlife challenges. Wittig 
(2016) suggests that corruption is used by criminal 
networks to facilitate operations of both specialised 
and opportunistic wildlife trafficking. In view of van Uhm 
and Moreto (2016), it negatively affects enforcement 
through reducing effectiveness by taking scarce resources 
away from departments in charge of law enforcement. 
Additionally, they argue that corruption is also used to 
help dilute sanctions and consequently non-compliance is 
incentivised leading to increased repeat offending. 
Non-regulatory solutions and tools 
As highlighted in the previous section, policy responses to 
the IWT have been predominantly regulatory (Challender 
et al., 2015). However, it has been clear that regulatory 
solutions are never enough to face IWT, especially with 
contextual factors, such as the rising demand on high-
value wildlife species and commodities, as well as the 
increased poverty of the local communities in source 
countries, where the livelihoods of many people depend 
largely on the natural resources from the nearby forests. 
This is why, since the beginning of the 1980s, the purely 
regulatory approaches to nature conservation have been 
increasingly challenged, and gradually replaced, or rather 
complemented with, “community-based conservation 
approaches”. These approaches rather go beyond law 
enforcement and use diverse tools, focusing especially 
on involving the local communities in the efforts to fight 
illegality. Community- based approaches do not only focus 
on conservation, but they also take into account other 
important considerations like sustainable development, 
poverty alleviation, local communities’ rights to manage 
lands and natural resources and so on (Buchenrieder and 
Balgah, 2013). However, these approaches still attract far 
less attention and investment from different stakeholders, 
as the local community tends to be perceived as part of 
the problem rather than a part of the solution (Biggs et al., 
2017). 
Engagement with the local communities
Many studies conducted in the global South, especially 
in Africa, show that most of the costs related to illegal 
harvesting and trade in wildlife is actually endured 
by the local communities living near national parks 
or protected areas (Wicander and Coad, 2018; Biggs 
et al., 2017). These costs increase especially when 
these activities affect their ability to meet their cultural, 
subsistence, economic needs or when there are cases 
of Human- Wildlife Conflict (HWC). Increasing the role 
of communities in the fight against IWT requires options 
that make the total benefits of wildlife monitoring and 
conservation higher than its costs for local communities. 
Community based conservation approaches for instance 
seek to achieve “conservation outcomes including 
reduced poaching- predominantly either by increasing the 
financial benefits individuals receive through conservation, 
increasing the opportunity cost of behaviours that are 
incompatible with conservation or by installing normative 
compliance through providing public goods” (Biggs et al., 
2017). 
Using TEK in conservation efforts 
Before the introduction of modern technology in 
conservation efforts, conservation efforts relied heavily 
on Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK). This type of 
knowledge and practices allowed local communities, 
through experiences passed over generations, to 
conserve the available resources in the forests for the 
future generations. While some studies argue that TEK is 
primitive, less empirical, largely subjective, and relies on 
oral histories, folklore, and spiritual beliefs transmitted 
between generations; other studies suggest that this 
traditional knowledge can indeed be complementary 
to science (Sherstha and Lapeyere 2018; and Moller et 
al, 2004). Recent research argues that incorporating 
traditional knowledge into wildlife monitoring and 
other conservation efforts, do not only increase their 
effectiveness, but also decrease conflict, and promote 
a healthy relationship between conservationists (from 
the government or from NGOs) and the local community 
members(Sherstha and Lapeyere 2018). In fact, this 
explains the motivation to recruit rangers and guides from 
within communities around protected areas. 
Increasing benefits of conservation for the local 
communities 
Increasing benefits for communities has been widely 
reported as a key bottom up approach to addressing the 
problems of IWT under the Community- Based Natural 
Resource Management or (CBNRM) paradigm. Effective 
awareness raising campaigns about legislations and 
negative impacts of IWT on the local communities is far 
from enough. CBNRM approaches provide incentives to 
abandoning wrong practices amongst communities but 
also creating enabling conditions for local communities 
to manage their natural resources responsibly and 
sustainably (UNODC, 2020). 
Various other approaches have been tried and tested in 
different contexts. For instance, through strengthening 
community ownership rights and their capacity to use 
and manage benefits from wildlife, creating room for the 
traditional cultural practices in the conservation activities, 
and securing jobs for some of the local community 
members as park rangers or community guards or other 
nature-based tourism enterprises (Biggs et al., 2017). 
In Botswana, Mbaiwa and Stronza (2010) demonstrate 
that tourism development increases the value of wildlife 
to communities through improved rural livelihoods and 
conservation outcomes. Case study evidence from Niger 
and Nigeria effectively demonstrates that benefits provide 
the motivation for local communities to become more 
actively involved and committed to wildlife conservation 
(Roe and Jack, 2001).However, while evidence shows 
that improved wildlife conservation policy outcomes 
are related to community engagement, a threshold of 
community members need to be involved as well as 
strong mechanisms for transparency and accountability in 
the access and benefit sharing (Biggs et al., 2017). 
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Community-led monitoring and surveillance 
for Protected Areas (PAs)
Forest dependent communities suffer the most from 
unsustainable management of biodiversity in their 
communities. Hence, they have the greatest stake in 
promoting responsible management of the resources. In 
this direction, communities have a role in working with 
other actors such as state and civil society as partners in 
law enforcement. 
An example of success is the Mali Elephant project, 
which managed to establish voluntary patrols from the 
members of the local community, to monitor the elephant 
population and detect any poaching happening within the 
PA; as well as to set up community- based management 
of natural resources and land use, from all different local 
ethnic groups. According to this set-up, the rules for 
resource use are set by a representative committee of 
elders, and enforcement is ensured by patrols of young 
men – the “Brigades de Surveillance”– who can call on 
the support of government forest officials (Roe, 2015). 
In many cases, the local populations are the best 
placed to know what is going on the ground in their 
neighbourhood. Here, the involvement of the local 
communities can serve two main purposes: they can 
be the “eyes and ears” of the formal law enforcement 
agencies, they can also apply social and informal 
sanctions to the community members who take part in 
any illicit activity. Mechanisms for reporting this should 
be easily accessible, allow anonymity and safety for 
those who report any information (Biggs et al., 2017).
Additional evidence from the EAGLE network in Africa 
demonstrates the role of community networks and 
informants in independent monitoring of wildlife and 
enforcement through investigations, arrest operations 
including national law enforcement (Mbzibain and 
Nkuintchua, upcoming). Civil society organizations 
managed, successfully, to establish networks of local 
informants, willing to use technologies, like smart phones, 
to report violations they witness in their communities in 
cases of forestry or wildlife crimes, to the duty bearers 
(local authorities and local law enforcement agencies) 
and other civil society monitors (European Union, 2005). 
Hence, such technology has contributed in increasing the 
role of communities in monitoring and denunciation of 
cases of illegal activity (CIDT, 2020).An important thing 
to note here, is the importance of providing fast, well 
equipped and strong back-up force from the competent 
authorities, with the power to arrest perpetrators and 
stop them in cases of violence, given the increasingly 
militarized nature of some IWT activities particularly 
poaching, as we have highlighted previously. 
Compensation as a policy tool to face IWT 
resulting from Human-Wildlife Conflict 
The feeling of being negatively affected by wildlife can 
lead members of the local communities to feeling anger 
and resentment towards wildlife and all conservation 
efforts. It can also lead to retaliatory or reactive poaching 
(Biggs et al., 2017; Dickman, 2010). Compensatory 
approaches have been associated with efforts to curb 
illegal activity and trade in wildlife but also human-wildlife 
conflicts, where heavy losses are caused by wild animals 
to crops, livestock and/or even human lives. 
In order to address the issue of loss or reduction of 
livelihoods because of conservation activities, some 
governments, such as the Indian Government, have 
implemented for decades now, a policy of financial 
compensation for livelihood losses resulting from 
Human- Wildlife Conflict. This compensation policy 
mitigated the economic losses as well as promoted 
tolerance for conservation activities among local 
communities of forest-dwellers (Johnson et al. 2018). 
From an economic point of view, this compensation 
policy may also have a negative influence on 
conservation efforts. This is driven by the simple 
insight that compensation payments in rural and forest-
adjacent communities may actually encourage them, 
unintentionally, to expand their agricultural and/or 
livestock rearing activity, which will eventually lead to 
the expansion of available lands for these activities. This 
may lead, if not well- monitored by the authorities, to the 
loss of habitat for wildlife. Hence, some compensation 
programmes, if not well- studied, may lead to a trade-off 
between wildlife mortality due to hunting and habitat loss 
(Bulte and Rondeau, 2005). 
Though this policy has proven generally effective in some 
protected areas, studies also demonstrate that it has 
many limitations, and sometimes even fail to meet its 
objectives. On the one hand, some studies show that, 
historically, the compensation policy design has been, 
for decades, solely focused on the damaged caused by 
large, charismatic and more attractive protected species, 
like elephants or tigers. While in fact, it ignores the loss 
of crop, livestock or even human death or injury caused 
by other sorts of smaller or less charismatic species. 
All of these losses are perceived by some of the forest 
communities as “not worth reporting”, because they will 
not be eligible for compensation (Johnson et al. 2018). 
On another note, this policy implies a high risk of 
corruption, mismanagement of funds, and complicated 
bureaucratic procedures in its implementation. 
Complicated bureaucratic procedures and the lack 
of state supervision on its civil servants working 
in the compensation program, can have a negative 
consequence on the overall policy, and make local 
communities perceive the state as unwilling to address 
the true social and economic costs of conservation, and 
putting pressure on marginalized rural communities. 
On the other hand, the complexity of governmental 
procedures can also be a pressure on the local 
communities, since most of them have limited access 
to state services, education and formal governmental 
processes in general. They may find it hard to provide 
proof that wild animals are responsible for their loss 
of crops or livestock, they may as well find it hard to 
navigate the system altogether. This is when the losses 
remain unreported, but the local sentiment of injustice 
and frustration increases (Johnson et al., 2018). Where 
successful, this approach dissuades communities from 
overexploitation of forestry resources, overkilling of 
wildlife and/or engagement in illegal activity. In addition 
to financial compensation, other intervention tools can 
be also used to mitigate the risk of economic losses 
by wildlife, such as the construction of fences or other 
physical barriers to keep animals away from crops or 
livestock, insurance schemes for any damage caused 
by wild animals, and even control for problem wild 
animals (Biggs et al., 2017). Unfortunately, the use of 
fences has not always been successful for large animals 
such as elephants which always find ways to bypass or 
breakdown the fences. 
Alternative livelihood projects 
Bush meat is considered as one of the main sources of 
animal protein and an important source of income for the 
forest-dwellers. For example, in Cameroon, Ivory Coast 
and Liberia, sections of the population, mostly forest- 
dwellers, depend on bush meat to cover up to 70% of their 
protein needs (Buchenrieder and Balgah, 2013). On the 
same note, other studies have proven that bush meat is 
not only used by forest-dwellers as famine food, but its 
demand also comes from the growing urban populations 
who, having access to domestic meats, consume wild 
meat as luxury goods (Van Vliet and Mbazza, 2011). 
The need for animal protein by forest dependent 
communities, as well as increasing demand from urban 
and international markets for different reasons, is a major 
driver of illegal harvesting and trade of wildlife.
Having said that, the provision of alternative protein and 
other income-generating activities is one of the most 
widely used policy options in source countries to reduce 
bush meat consumption and trade on the community 
level. The main objective of this type of policy is to 
introduce or strengthen the existing low-cost, easily 
implementable projects, which have low- environmental 
impact, and can supply the local communities with the 
necessary source of meat or an alternative source of 
income. Many such alternative livelihood projects have 
been implemented in West and Central Africa, and they 
remain a major focus of governments in this region. 
Examples of such project can be found, for example, 
in Kenya as the Anne Kent Taylor Fund (AKTF) assists 
the Massai communities in finding opportunities for 
economic development, linking them with conservation 
efforts. The AKTF loans the women’s groups from the 
community start-up funds to buy supplies and produce 
items for the market (mainly beaded accessories), which 
Anne Kent sells in the U.S. and in local tourist markets. 
On the other hand, AKTF supports de-snaring/anti-
poaching teams comprised of young Maasai men from 
the same communities. The involvement of both women 
(as accessory makers) and the men (in the de-snaring/
anti-poaching patrols) provides broad based financial 
incentives for Maasai communities to conserve wildlife 
(Van Vliet, 2011).A similar example can be found in 
Burundi, in the framework of the Ruvubupark Biodiversity 
Conservation project, which offers chances for the local 
community to generate more income/protein production 
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through cattle rearing and beekeeping, to replace 
poaching. The project implementers chose to provide 
local community with these two activities at the same 
time, as villagers in the region already had experience in 
both. Beekeeping will allow them to generate income on 
the short term, while their herds developed on the longer 
term (Wicander and Coad, 2018).
Still, it is necessary to highlight that the provision of 
alternatives does not always lead to a reduction in 
illegal poaching or trade of wild animals. In the case of 
promotion of small livestock projects, cultural believes, 
community and urban dietary habits and preferences 
towards bush meat limit their success (Carla et al., 
2015). Failure in some cases is also due to the lack of 
regular monitoring and imposing sanctions on those who 
participate in these alternative livelihoods project but still 
resort to poaching and trade from time to time. A further 
analysis of the participants of these projects indicate 
that the alternative livelihoods projects’ capacities are 
limited compared to the number of hunters in the local 
communities. According to some researchers, these 
projects tend to attract more women with limited or no 
income, or elderly hunters who are looking for ways to 
diversify their income and “retire” from business, rather 
than fully active, commercial hunters who represent a real 
threat to the environment (Wicander and Coad, 2018).
Increasing the costs of participation in IWT
Recent evidence suggests that science can be used to 
devalue certain wildlife products such as infusing rhino 
horns with chemicals (Ferreira et al., 2014) such that 
it disincentives illegal actors from killing the animals. 
Law enforcement is a key deterrent through increasing 
detection, arrest and prosecution of presumed illegal 
cases. Some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for Gabon, 
the new Law n°042/2018 of 5 July 2019 on the Penal 
Code increased the penalties for ivory trafficking to 
a maximum of 10 years in prison, this penalty being 
doubled in the event of aggravating circumstances 
(organized gangs, transnational offences, persons 
holding public authority, including professionals in the 
Water and Forests and Wildlife sectors). However, the 
most commonly used way in deterring IWT and increase 
the costs associated to it is through law enforcement. 
As mentioned in the previous section, most of this 
law enforcement is state-led; but recently, there have 
been some private organizations involved in that 
too, including large, highly trained and well-equipped 
international conservation organizations. This increases 
the probability of detection and capture of perpetrators, 
and the chances of their prosecution and sanctioning. 
It is worth mentioning that arrest and prosecutions are 
not sufficient. Recent research conducted on wildlife 
crimes in Uganda suggests that sometimes state-led law 
enforcement can have a negative impact on the local 
communities, as it may increase their sense of perceived 
injustice. It is most likely that those involved in profitable 
commercial wildlife trade will be able to either pay the 
due fines or pay bribes to avoid prosecution; while those 
involved in subsistence wildlife crimes will not be able 
to afford paying the fines and will either have to face 
imprisonment or will have to sell lands or lose other 
important sources of income of their already poor family 
to pay the fines (Harrison et al., 2015). 
Therefore, the application of deterrent sanctions 
particularly through dismantling criminal networks and 
fines/seizures of accumulated income and assets could 
further increase costs and deter engagement in illegality. 
It should, however, pay attention in the differentiation 
between commercial wildlife hunters and smugglers, and 
those who were involved in that type of crimes for lack of 
other sources to obtain necessities like food or firewood. 
Advocacy pathways
Advocacy at national and international levels provides an 
opportunity for concerned actors to bring suggestions to 
the table and seek to influence policies and processes 
linked to IWT. At international level, CITES framework 
remains an important arena as well as Convention on 
Biological Diversity. Unfortunately, some signatories to 
the CITES framework, especially source countries, still 
do not perceive IWT as a serious crime. This is why it 
is important for civil society organizations, locally and 
internationally, to hold these governments to account 
and pressure them to allocate resources to wildlife 
law enforcement. The aim is not just to make these 
governments acknowledge IWT as a serious crime worth 
investing money to fight it, but also to address gaps in 
legislations, and to ensure serious and strict penalties are 
imposed on violators, which is necessary for deterrence 
(UNEP report, 2018). 
International, regional and national gatherings of policy 
makers and governments provide unique advocacy 
opportunities for civil society organisations (Harrison et 
al., 2015). Innovative advocacy approaches are required 
backed by evidence to influence decision makers and 
transform the shape of international relations around the 
subject of IWT (Humphreys and Smith, 2011). 
The place and role of enhancing evidence- 
based advocacy and decision making 
As research on IWT has previously highlighted (Kassa 
et al., 2019), the true extent, the impact and the volume 
of IWT is still not fully understood or studied (Oldfield 
et al., 2003). Even the estimations of IWT vary widely 
between organizations, mainly due to the lack of 
accurate data around this phenomenon because of its 
clandestine nature (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime - UNODC, 2020). Improved understanding of this 
phenomenon including its scale, impacts, and drivers 
could provide policy makers and practitioners with a 
better understanding and better recommendations on 
addressing this issue. Research in this area continues to 
be multifaceted as expected and there have been calls 
for more collaboration or cross-disciplinary focus (Crayne 
and Haenlein, 2016).
Past research by conservation biologists recommends 
greater unpacking of how the overexploitation of a 
certain species affect the entire ecosystem in which 
it exists (UNODC, 2020). On the social and economic 
levels, the impact of alternative livelihoods projects on 
local communities and their effectiveness in reducing 
IWT remains understudied (Coad 2018). Much has 
been written about Human Wildlife Conflict (HWC) as 
a driver of IWT, yet Dickman (2010) argues that better 
understanding of community attitudes and their actions 
faced with the impacts of wildlife particularly on their 
livelihoods requires further understanding. In this 
direction, recent studies by Harrison et al (2015) and 
Kassa et al (2019) focus on the drivers and facilitators of 
this trade.
Figure 1: Facilitators and drivers of IWT
Source: Kassa et al (2019, p8) 
With a focus on Uganda, IIED map out five major 
drivers of IWT with subsistence and illegal commercial 
exploitation emerging as the most important drivers 
followed by retaliation killings. As previously highlighted, 
some forest-adjacent communities may feel, rightly 
or wrongly, that they are carrying the heavier burden 
of conservation and respecting biodiversity, without 
being properly compensated by the authorities. There 
is also an important cultural and traditional element in 
the drivers for wildlife crimes, as most of the medicinal 
plants, and animals used in traditional medicine remain 
in the protected areas or within timber or other extractive 
industry concessions. These findings are supported by 
findings from Harrison et al (2015), who show that the 
politicisation of access to protected areas by politicians 
promotes encroachment and incursions into these areas. 
In addition to these factors, Kassa et al (2019) focus on 
the demand and attitudes towards wildlife. As mentioned 
earlier, global demand for IWT is driven by increasing 
Asian middle-class markets where wildlife and wildlife 
products portray images of wealth and status. Increasing 
use of these products for traditional medicine promote 
the demand for these products. In supply countries, this 
is facilitated by the fact that appropriating wildlife is seen 
as moral and a “victimless crime”. This situation is further 
facilitated by lack of tourism in many cases to increase 
the value of wildlife to communities (Ondoua et al., 2017; 
Bouche, 2012)
Underlying these drivers are the socio-political, economic, 
governance and legal contexts in which IWT takes place 
(Bouche et al., 2012; Kassa et al., 2019). What emerges 
overall in the IWT research sphere is the focus on the role 
of international conservation agencies, governments and 
illegal crime networks while the role of national NGOs and 
community based organisations particularly in Central 
Africa remains curiously limited in the fight against IWT 
(Mbzibain and Ongolo, 2019). Additionally, considering 
that a lot of the poaching and illegal activities take place 
in forest concessions, the direct or indirect role of forest 
exploitation companies (Rayden and Essono, 2010) has 
curiously received little attention from academic role of 
private sector companies (Karsenty and Ferron, 2017). 
Further support to addressing the complex links between 
communities, private sector operators in extractive 
industries, international conservation NGOs but also 
linkages with traditional law enforcement agencies 
could strengthen law enforcement (Conservation 
Justice, 2019). The complexity of this subject requires 
significant cross-disciplinary collaboration at multiple 
levels to ensure that information and evidence generated 
is comprehensive enough to provide practical policy 
recommendations that can help curb the catastrophic 
impacts of this global crime (WWF, 2016). Recent 
initiatives such as the TRAFFIC Trace initiative7 which 
promotes the use of forensic science in biodiversity 
conservation and the investigation of wildlife crime 
provide opportunities for forensic scientists and 
enforcement agencies to exchange information on the 
latest challenges facing wildlife law enforcement and 
modern techniques for tackling them. Independent forest 
and wildlife monitoring projects8 which bring together 
multi-stakeholders under environmental crime working 
groups in source countries also represent fora where 
evidence and information can be used by decision 
makers to strengthen law enforcement. This is however 
challenging where governance is poor and where the 
political will to address wildlife crime is low.
Managing demand
As mentioned earlier, demand for wildlife products is a 
key driver of IWT. Consumption of bush meat is highly 
important for livelihoods and in some cases represent 
the only source of available protein and income(Oldfield 
et al., 2001; Van Vliet, 2011; Buchenrieder and Balgah, 
2013).Wildlife products have a spiritual and medicinal 
values in many cultures (Van Vliet, 2011). From every 
indication, the fight against IWT cannot be achieved only 
by regulatory or policy interventions as evidence suggests 
sometimes imposing new restrictions on the supply tends 
to drive the demand into the illegal market (Drury, 2011; 
Oldfield et al., 2003). Finding other complementary means 
to reduce demand for products becomes critical.
Awareness raising
Awareness raising can play a strong role in decreasing 
individual demand. For example, demand on rare types 
of amphibians as exotic pets has significantly declined 
in the USA and Europe after strong awareness-raising 
campaigns (UNEP report, 2018). A similar number of 
campaigns have been recently initiated also in countries 
in Asia, which have been identified as countries with high 
demand on wildlife products, mainly China, Vietnam, and 
Thailand (iThink toolkit, 2016). These campaigns aim, 
globally, at creating awareness among people about 
the harmful impacts of wildlife products consumption 
on nature; as well as to inform them about the illegality 
of this act, and to alter their perception about their 
consumption by questioning the products’ value as 
symbol of wealth or power. In that context, most of 
these campaigns work on shaping strong messages to 
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mainstream or social media. Such campaigns must be 
based on evidence and improved understanding of the 
behaviours and motivations of different stakeholder 
groups involved along the chain.
In her article on urban consumer demand for wild animal 
products in Vietnam, Drury (2011)found that escalating 
demand was driven by growing urban middle and upper 
classes in Hanoi (the capital city) and other towns. This 
included the consumption of various species like bears, 
crocodiles, serpents, soft-shelled turtles, deer and wild 
pigs. Another study showed that exchanging artefacts 
made of ivory between business colleagues in China was 
considered as a valuable currency in the economy of 
social relationships, as it reflected fine taste, high social 
status and a certain value for tradition and history (WWF, 
2016). Drury has argued that limited understanding of 
consumers’ motives and patterns of behaviour is a key 
factor which limits the effectiveness of information and 
awareness campaigns. 
Successful campaigns have to carefully define their target 
audience and conduct an in-depth multi-disciplinary 
research to understand their social, cultural context, and 
even their underlying psychological motivations (iThink 
toolkit, 2016). 
Another trend in conducting awareness campaigns have 
been identified by World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 
focuses on the psychosocial motivations of wildlife 
products’ consumptions, and simply working to change 
their behaviour through “redirecting” their desires into 
new ways of thinking and acting. It is important to 
identify and propose alternatives practices that may fill 
consumers’ core needs without harming wildlife and 
the environment (WWF, 2016). An example of that is 
the use of cattle bones instead of ivory and other tusks 
of protected species in the making of souvenirs and 
handcrafted objects. Skilful artisans can carve and shape 
objects to make them resemble their true origins, to the 
point that these objects made out of cattle bones often 
appear in wildlife forensic casework (Sims et al. 2011). 
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Conclusion
The objective of this information note was to explore the 
various tools available to policy makers and practitioners 
regarding the fight against IWT. The COVID 19 global 
pandemic provides a stack reminder of the global impacts 
of illegal wildlife trade and the need for global multi-
stakeholder engagement to address the problem. The 
paper shows that focus on regulatory solutions and law 
enforcement alone, is not enough, and it can sometimes 
even prove counterproductive. While the enactment of 
recent Chinese ban on trade represent significant reactive 
regulatory efforts to fight this crime, the need for more 
proactive forward-looking regulations and effective law 
enforcement remain central to the battle against IWT. 
As sophisticated criminal gangs get involved in IWT, 
evidence shows that green militarisation becomes a 
key strategy which includes using military principles in 
law enforcement. In areas of state failure and conflict, 
the use of traditional law enforcement officials such as 
the military is increasingly being employed to fight back 
armed groups. This requires investments in advanced 
technological innovations and equipment, such as drones, 
cameras and other monitoring equipment, to monitor 
protected areas and track down perpetrators, not to 
mention the need to train their law enforcement agents on 
the use of all this new technology and forensic science. 
Unfortunately, this paper shows that many source 
governments have enacted legislative frameworks but 
lack the capabilities to monitor and ensure compliance 
with existing regulations. In many cases, decision- 
makers and law enforcers do not perceive poaching 
or illegal trade in wildlife products as a priority crime 
to begin with. The situation is further exacerbated 
by systemic corruption and other social political and 
governance failures. Significant focus must be on fighting 
and exposing corruption at all levels and for securing 
the necessary capabilities to combat poaching and 
subsequent trafficking of wildlife and wildlife products.
With the failure of traditional regulatory and law 
enforcement options, complementary solutions which 
focus on working with communities on monitoring 
and livelihoods, civil society awareness raising and 
advocacy at national, regional and international levels 
need strengthening. Excellent cases studies from the 
Eagle network which works with communities and law 
enforcement agencies through community mobilisation, 
investigations, arrests, prosecutions and media 
campaigns to name and shame traffickers represent 
successful and tested models to be scaled up. In any 
this requires the political will of authorities to work 
collaboratively with civil society organisations which 
unfortunately is not always the case. 
Multi-stakeholder collaborative research and evidence 
is critical in informing policy decision making but also 
providing the ammunition required by civil society for 
research informed advocacy campaigns. Improving 
transparency in the sector through fight against 
corruption, community monitoring and use of citizen 
technologies provide opportunities for naming and 
shaming and exposing the modus operandi of criminal 
networks operating in the area. Linking national advocacy 
efforts to global governance frameworks such as CITES 
provide additional frameworks for addressing the 
underlying drivers of this trade.
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